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Abstract
This paper analyzes the implications of heterogeneity in price setting for the real eﬀects of
monetary shocks. Starting from otherwise standard sticky price and sticky information models, I
introduce ex-ante heterogeneity in terms of price setting frictions, and compare the resulting dy-
namics with those of identical ﬁrms economies under alternative calibrations. Both the qualitative
and the quantitative results show that heterogeneity leads monetary shocks to have substantially
larger and more persistent real eﬀects. In particular, reproducing the dynamics of a truly hetero-
geneous economy with a model based on identical ﬁrms requires unrealistically large degrees of
price setting frictions.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Standard models of sticky prices and sticky information usually do not involve any explicit attempt to
model heterogeneity in ﬁrms’ price setting behavior. They are usually assumed to be ex-ante identical,
except for diﬀerences in the timing of price adjustments or information updating. However, at least
for the sticky price models, which can be confronted with micro datasets on price setting behavior,
there is ample evidence that ﬁrms do in fact diﬀer substantially in terms of the frequency of price
adjustments (see Blinder et al., 1998 and Bils and Klenow, 2004 for the US economy; Dhyne et al.,
2004, and references cited therein for the Euro area). So, apart from analytical convenience, the only
reason not to take heterogeneity explicitly into account would be if it did not matter qualitatively
in aggregate terms, or at least not quantitatively.
In this paper I argue that this is not the case. Starting from otherwise standard sticky price and
sticky information models, I introduce ex-ante heterogeneity in terms of price setting frictions, and
compare the resulting dynamics with those of identical ﬁrms economies under alternative calibrations.
Both the qualitative and the quantitative results show that heterogeneity leads monetary shocks to
have substantially larger and more persistent real eﬀects.
Recently, the basic versions of models of price setting have been transformed or extended in
several directions, in search of mechanisms which can generate more persistent dynamics in response
to monetary shocks.1 The role of heterogeneity in these models, however, has not yet been properly
explored. To what extent can heterogeneity be a source of persistence by itself? Are there important
diﬀerences between ex-ante and ex-post heterogeneity? Once there is heterogeneity, how should
we match these models to the data? Are the implications diﬀerent for diﬀerent types of monetary
shocks?
Some recent papers which involve heterogeneity in terms of price setting behavior are Ohanian
et al. (1995), Bils and Klenow (2004), Bils et al. (2003) and Barsky et al. (2003). Taylor (1993),
in particular, extended his original model (1979, 1980) to account for contract lengths of diﬀerent
durations. However, none of these papers focuses on isolating the role of heterogeneity. This requires
comparing models with heterogeneous ﬁrms with otherwise equivalent models in which all ﬁrms are
identical. Exceptions are Aoki (2001) and Benigno (2004), who explore this comparison to show
that ex-ante heterogeneity in the context of Calvo pricing does aﬀect optimal monetary policy, and
Dixon and Kara (2005a), who study heterogeneity in the context of Taylor staggered wage setting.
On the empirical front, Jadresic (1999) presents econometric evidence that heterogeneity improves
the performance of sticky price models when applied to U.S. data, and Coenen and Levin (2004)
document promising performance of DSGE models with heterogeneity in price rigidity, using data for
Germany. In a diﬀerent framework in which ﬁrms follow state- rather than time-dependent pricing
1A common departure from the basic settings has been to change Calvo’s pricing to account for some sort of
indexation (Yun (1996), Gali and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003)). Sticky information models, starting with Mankiw
and Reis (2002), were themselves developed as part of this research eﬀort. Other examples are Calvo, Celasun and
Kumhof (2003), who assume that ﬁrms choose (linear) price paths rather than levels, and the related paper by Devereux
and Yetman (2003), who compare the dynamic implications of ﬁxed-prices versus predetermined price paths in a Calvo-
style framework.
2rules, Caballero and Engel (1991, 1993) show that ex-ante (“structural”) heterogeneity aﬀects the
dynamic response of the economy to shocks in an important way. In particular, they show that under
some circumstances it may slow down the economy’s adjustment process. Heterogeneity also plays
a role in terms of guaranteeing existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.2
In this paper I use simple continuous-time versions of four price setting models to address the
questions raised above. The ﬁrst two (sticky price) models build on the seminal contributions of
Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1979, 1980). The other two are sticky information models, based on
Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Dupor and Tsuruga (2005). I compare the dynamic response of the
various heterogeneous economies to those of identical ﬁrms economies under alternative calibrations,
for two classes of AR(1) type shocks: level and growth rate shocks to nominal aggregate demand.
In general, the dynamics of the heterogeneous economies depend on the underlying distribution
of frictions. For the case of permanent level and growth rate shocks, however, I am able to derive
the implications of heterogeneity for the cumulative output eﬀects of monetary shocks for arbitrary
distributions. Albeit particular, these results turn o u tt oi l l u s t r a t eq u a l i t a t i v e l yt h er o l eo fh e t e r o -
geneity in the more general cases. For the other results, I use the statistics reported recently by Bils
and Klenow (2004) for the US economy to calibrate the relevant distribution for each model.
The ﬁrst result is that the usual calibration of identical ﬁrms models, which is based on average
frequencies of price adjustment (or of price plan revisions for the sticky information models), always
understates the real eﬀects of monetary shocks relative to the underlying heterogeneous economy.
The reason is that such eﬀects are more directly related to the relevant average durations rather
than frequencies, and, because of Jensen’s inequality, average durations exceed the inverse of the
corresponding average frequencies.
Accounting for this bias, however, does not suﬃce in general. For growth rate shocks, heterogene-
ity has a direct eﬀect on the real eﬀects of monetary shocks in addition to the bias engendered by
Jensen’s inequality. Moreover, in the presence of strategic complementarities in price setting (or real
rigidities), the interaction of ﬁrms with higher and lower frictions ampliﬁes the role of heterogeneity
in generating persistence, for all types of shocks.
How large are these eﬀects likely to be in quantitative terms? What fraction of persistence not
accounted for by models with identical ﬁrms can be explained with realistic degrees of heterogeneity?
To address these questions I perform the following experiment: given the empirical distribution of
price rigidities reported by Bils and Klenow (2004), I ﬁnd the average duration and degree of strategic
complementarities in the identical ﬁrms economy that minimize the distance of its impulse response
functions to those of the heterogeneous economy. Despite the fact that the average duration of price
rigidity reported by Bils and Klenow (2004) is approximately 2.2 quarters, the “best ﬁtting average
duration” for the identical ﬁrms models ranges from 5 to 11 quarters, depending on the model, the
type of shock, and the degree of strategic complementarity in the original heterogeneous economy.
A straightforward, but important implication of these results is that we must be careful when
2Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2004) also present a model with state-dependent pricing, in which heterogeneity in the
frequency of price adjustments arises from the fact that ﬁrms in diﬀerent markets face consumers with diﬀerent search
intensities.
3relating parameters of models based on identical ﬁrms to micro evidence on price setting behavior,
and when interpreting estimates of parameters based on identical ﬁrms models. While they may be
able to provide a reasonable description of a more complex, heterogeneous reality, this is likely to
require parameter values which will seem unrealistic if interpreted literally. The fact is that, given
the empirical evidence documenting a high degree of heterogeneity and the fact that it does matter
for the dynamic response of monetary economies to shocks, the parameters of (mispeciﬁed) identical
ﬁr m sm o d e l sc a n n o tb es e e na s“ s t r u c t u r a l ,” and should be treated accordingly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic setup and introduces
the four price setting models in separate subsections. Section 3 presents the steady states, introduces
monetary shocks, and derives the equations which characterize the dynamic response of the economy
to such shocks for each model. In the following section I provide qualitative and analytical results
which illustrate the role of heterogeneity. Section 5 presents quantitative results on the importance of
the eﬀects analyzed in the previous sections. It shows that heterogeneity interacts with real rigidities
to make the process of adjustment to shocks substantially more sluggish, and that the parameters
of identical ﬁrms models are “distorted” when trying to mimic the dynamics of truly heterogeneous
economies. The last section concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2M o d e l s
This section presents the basic setup, with the assumptions which are common to the models of
price setting that will be introduced in speciﬁc subsections. The modeling strategy is to introduce
ex-ante heterogeneity in terms of price setting frictions into otherwise standard sticky price and
sticky information models. For brevity and to highlight the central results of the paper, I model the
demand side of the economy in the simplest possible way and use reduced form equations which can
be derived from ﬁrst principles as in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), and Ball and Romer (1989),
for instance.3 The models are set in continuous time.
2.1 Basic setup
In the economy there is a continuum of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms divided into groups, which diﬀer
with respect to the friction they face to set prices. More precisely, in the two models with sticky
prices (which build on Calvo, 1983, and Taylor, 1979, 1980), each group has a diﬀerent frequency of
price adjustment, while in the versions of the model with sticky information (building on Mankiw
and Reis, 2002, and Dupor and Tsuruga, 2005), each group updates information with a diﬀerent
frequency.
Firms will be indexed by their group, n,a n db yi ∈ [0,1]. Each group is indexed by n ∈ [0,n ∗],
which also determines the intensity of the friction that they face. In the models with sticky prices,
n measures the time interval during which a new price is expected to remain ﬁxed, and ranges,
correspondingly, from “continuous adjustment” to “adjustment at intervals of (expected) length n∗.”
3See also Woodford (2003).
4In the cases of sticky information, n is the expected time interval between dates of information
updating, ranging from “continuous information updating” to “updating at intervals of (expected)
length n∗.” The distribution of ﬁrms across groups is summarized by a density function f (·) on [0,n ∗],
with cdf F (·).4 The degree of heterogeneity will be measured by the dispersion of such distribution.
In the absence of frictions to price adjustment and information collection, it is assumed that the
optimal level of the individual relative price, which is the same for all ﬁrms, is given by:5
p∗ (t) − p(t)=θy(t), (1)
where p∗ is the individual frictionless optimal price, p is the aggregate price level and y is the output
gap (which equals aggregate demand, because the natural rate is normalized to be identically equal








where xn,i(t) is the price charged by ﬁrm i from group n at time t.
To focus on the supply side of the model, I assume that nominal aggregate demand, m(t)=
y(t)+p(t), follows an exogenous process.6
Combining nominal aggregate demand and equation (1) yields:
p∗ (t)=θm(t)+( 1− θ)p(t). (2)
In a frictionless world, each ﬁrm would choose xn,i(t)=p∗(t) and the resulting aggregate price
level would be p(t)=m(t). Thus, aggregate output and individual prices would be given by y(t)=0
and xn,i(t)=m(t), respectively.
2.2 Calvo pricing
In this subsection I introduce frictions through price setting as in Calvo (1983). For each ﬁrm, the
opportunity to change prices arrives according to a Poisson process, with rate given by the inverse
of the expected duration of price rigidity for the ﬁrms’ group ( 1
n).
For simplicity, based on a second order approximation to the loss incurred from not charging
the optimal price, ﬁrms are assumed to set prices to minimize expected squared deviations from the
optimal price:













nsEtp∗ (t + s)ds.
4All results hold in the case of discrete or mixed distributions.
5All variables should be interpreted as log-deviations from the deterministic, zero inﬂation steady state.
6This simpliﬁcation is also used by Mankiw and Reis (2002), among others. See also Woodford (2003).











2.3 Taylor staggered price setting
Building on Taylor (1979, 1980), in this case ﬁrms are assumed to set prices for a ﬁx e dp e r i o do f
time. Firms from group n set prices for a period of length n. Adjustments are uniformly staggered
across time in terms of both ﬁrms and groups.
Assuming the same second order approximation to the loss incurred from not charging the optimal
price, ﬁrms set prices according to:











Etp∗ (t + s)ds.










2.4 Sticky information (Mankiw and Reis, 2002)
Following the sticky information model proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002), ﬁrms can only update
their information sets when they receive a “Poisson signal.” The hazard rate for group n equals the
inverse of the expected time interval between two subsequent updates (1
n).
There are no impediments to price adjustment, so that ﬁrms set prices at each instant to minimize
the expected squared deviation from the frictionless optimal price, conditional on the information
available when they last had a chance to update:
pn,i (t)=a r g m i n
x Esn,i [x − p∗ (t)]
2
= Esn,ip∗ (t),
where sn,i ≤ t indicates the time when ﬁrm i from group n last updated its information set.











2.5 “Staggered sticky information” (Dupor and Tsuruga, 2005)
Based on the staggered sticky information model of Dupor and Tsuruga (2005), ﬁrms from group
n update their information sets at intervals of length n. Information updating dates are uniformly
6staggered across time in terms of both ﬁrms and groups.
Again, ﬁrms are not prevented from changing prices, and so set them exactly as in the previous
subsection. However, due to the diﬀerence in the distribution of times of information updating, the










2.6 Economy-wide expected durations
This subsection derives the economy-wide, or cross-sectional expected duration of price rigidity and
of price plans for the sticky price and sticky information models, respectively. In the case of both
models with Poisson signals it is trivially equal to the corresponding duration for any individual ﬁrm.
In the models with uniform staggering, however, these measures diﬀer in a way that will be useful
to understand some of the results presented later in the paper.
Starting with the Calvo model, at any point in time every ﬁrm from group n expects its price to
remain ﬁxed for an interval of length n. The expected duration of price rigidity in the economy as a
whole is, therefore, trivially equal to n ≡
R n∗
0 f (n)ndn. Analogous reasoning leads to the result that
the expected duration of a price plan in the standard sticky information economy is also equal to n.
Consider now a Taylor type model in which all ﬁrms set prices for periods of length n.W h i l e
it is true that upon setting a new price at t it will remain ﬁxed until t + n,a ta n yp o i n ti nt i m e
the duration of price rigidity for a randomly selected ﬁrm will be less than n. In fact, given the
assumption of uniform staggering of adjustment dates across time, it will be equal to n
2. Extending
the logic to the case of an economy with heterogeneous ﬁrms, the average duration of price rigidity
in the economy as a whole will be given by n
2. Analogously, the average duration of a price plan in
an economy with staggered sticky information is given by n
2.
As highlighted by Dupor and Tsuruga (2005), and Dixon and Kara (2005b), the standard calibra-
tion in identical ﬁrms models is based on the expected duration of a new price, not the economy-wide
duration. As a consequence, it implies twice as much duration of price rigidity in Calvo’s model rela-
tive to Taylor’s (and analogously for the standard sticky information model relative to the staggered
sticky information case). This is an important source of diﬀerences in quantitative results generated
by these models under the standard calibration, and, to a large extent, explain the results found by
Kiley (2002).
3 Steady state and monetary shocks
This section describes the steady state and the types of shocks that will be analyzed. I assume that
the economy is initially in an inﬂationary steady state that is expected to last forever, in which
nominal aggregate demand grows at a constant rate π ≥ 0. This implies that, after a normalization,
m(t)=πt. In the appendix I derive the equations characterizing individual ﬁrm behavior in each of
the models, and aggregate them to obtain a full description of the initial steady state in each case.
7In each experiment a particular shock to nominal aggregate demand hits the economy at time
t =0 . Then, for each price setting model I derive the equations which characterize the transition of
the economy into the new steady state. I focus on AR(1) type shocks to the level and growth rate of
nominal aggregate demand. The particular (but interesting) cases of permanent shocks obtain when
the decay parameters are set equal to zero.
3.1 Level shocks
I assume, without loss of generality, that π =0 ,7 and that at t =0nominal aggregate demand is
hit by a shock of size m, which then decays exponentially at rate ρ ≥ 0. The particular case of a
permanent level shock obtains when ρ =0 .F o r t ≥ 0, the path for nominal aggregate demand is
therefore given by m(t)=me−ρt.
3.1.1 Calvo pricing
















θme−ρ(t+s) +( 1− θ)p(t + s)
´
ds.




























θme−ρ(t+r) +( 1− θ)p(t + r)
´
drdsdn, (3)
where the second integral in the last expression ranges from 0 (and not from −∞)t ot because
p(0) = 0.
3.1.2 Taylor staggered price setting












θme−ρ(t+s) +( 1− θ)p(t + s)ds.
The aggregate price level is, again, deﬁned implicitly. For 0 ≤ t ≤ n∗ there are ﬁrms with prices
7This is just a translation of axis.





































θme−ρ(t−s+r) +( 1− θ)p(t − s + r)drdsdn.













θme−ρ(t−s+r) +( 1− θ)p(t − s + r)drdsdn. (5)
3.1.3 Sticky information
In this case the relevant distinction is between ﬁrms that had the opportunity to update their pricing
plans after the shock, and ﬁrms that are still setting prices based on their previous information.
Firms which get to update their plans set:
pn,i (t)=Es≥0p∗ (t)
= θme−ρt +( 1− θ)p(t),
where Es≥0 indicates expectation conditional on information sets which include knowledge of the
shock.8





















θme−ρt +( 1− θ)p(t)
¢
dsdn,
where again the second integral in the last expression ranges from 0 (and not from −∞)t ot because


















3.1.4 Staggered sticky information
The behavior of ﬁrms is exactly as in the previous case: whenever it is time for them to update their
plans after the shock they set a price path corresponding to the (expected) frictionless optimal price.
8Given that I am analyzing one-time surprise shocks in an otherwise perfect foresight model, all information sets
updated after t =0 are equal.
9To derive the aggregate price level, note that for 0 ≤ t ≤ n∗ some ﬁrms are still setting prices
























θme−ρt +( 1− θ)p(t)dsdn.
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t f (n) t
ndn
´. (7)
After t = n∗ all ﬁrms have updated their plans, and therefore:
p(t)=m(t)=me−ρt. (8)
3.2 Growth rate shocks




∂t jumps at t =0from π to π+∆π,w h e r e∆π is the size







m(s)ds = πt + ∆π1−e−λt
λ . Once more, the particular case of a permanent growth
rate shock obtains when λ =0 .
3.2.1 Calvo pricing
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drdsdn.
103.2.2 Taylor staggered price setting


















+( 1− θ)p(t + s)ds.
The aggregate price level is, again, deﬁned implicitly. For 0 ≤ t ≤ n∗ there are ﬁrms with prices















































+( 1− θ)p(t − s + r)drdsdn.
















+(1− θ)p(t − s + r)drdsdn. (11)
3.2.3 Sticky information


















































































3.2.4 Staggered sticky information
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´ . (13)





4 Qualitative features and some analytic results
This section presents qualitative and analytic results which illustrate the role of heterogeneity in the
models under consideration. In order to isolate its eﬀects, I need to construct a benchmark economy
with identical ﬁrms, retaining the same degree of frictions, in some sense. But what does that mean
exactly? In the sticky price models, does that mean matching the average duration of price rigidity,
or the average frequency of price adjustments? Likewise, in the context of sticky information models,
should we match the average life of a price plan, or the average frequency with which ﬁrms update
their plans? While with identical ﬁrms the degree of frictions can be equivalently summarized by
the relevant average durations or frequencies, with heterogeneous ﬁr m st h i si sn ol o n g e rt h ec a s e .
To illustrate how important these diﬀerences can be, I chose to simulate the dynamic response
of three economies with Calvo pricing to a permanent level shock to aggregate demand: one hetero-
geneous economy and two identical ﬁrms economies - one with the same average frequency of price
adjustments and the other with the same average duration of price rigidity as the heterogeneous
economy.9 Since heterogeneity and strategic complementarities in price setting (1 − θ)i n t e r a c ti n
9The features highlighted by this example are common to virtually all other cases (combinations of shocks and
12quantitatively important important ways to generate persistence, to better isolate the role of het-
erogeneity throughout this section I rule out strategic complementarities, and set θ =1 . The next
section shows that real rigidities strengthen the role of heterogeneity in generating persistence.
As can be seen from the equations presented in the previous section, in general the dynamics of
the heterogeneous economies will depend on the whole distribution of relevant frictions. To handle
this issue I chose to use the statistics on price setting behavior in the US economy reported by
Bils and Klenow (2004) to obtain the distribution used in the simulations. For simplicity, the same
data will be used to calibrate the relevant distribution for each of the four price setting models,
when needed. I take the distribution of the average duration between price changes (converted to
years) reported in their appendix to be the relevant distribution for nin each of the models. This
is arguably a sensible interpretation of their data in the context of the sticky price models analyzed
in this paper. The sticky information models are, however, impossible to reconcile with the micro
evidence on nominal price rigidity, since they imply continuous price adjustment. The choice of this
distribution in these cases is therefore more arbitrary, and I only use it for convenience. The reader
should be aware of the diﬀerent applicability of this empirical distribution to each of the models,
specially since it will also be the basis for the quantitative analysis presented in the next section.
Figure 1 presents the results of the above mentioned simulation. Keep in mind that the qualitative
features of this example are common to the other models analyzed in this paper. Relative to the
heterogeneous economy, the adjustment process in the identical ﬁrms economy with the same average
frequency of price changes is clearly too fast.10 Surprisingly, this is the standard usually adopted
to calibrate identical ﬁrms models based on micro evidence. The identical ﬁrms economy with the
average duration of price rigidity found in the data seems to give a better representation of the
heterogeneous economy.11 A qualitative diﬀerence between the latter two economies is that, initially,
adjustment is faster in the heterogeneous economy, because a relatively larger measure of ﬁrms
with higher frequency of adjustment gets to change prices earlier. As time passes, the distribution of
(expected) duration of price rigidity among ﬁrms which have not yet adjusted becomes more and more
dominated by ﬁrms with relatively longer (expected) contract lengths. So, the speed of adjustment
slows down through time, and eventually the process becomes more sluggish in the heterogeneous
economy.
A natural question to ask is whether there is a general rule to determine which parameterization
for an identical ﬁrms economy will best mimic the dynamics of a given heterogeneous economy, in
terms of its impulse response functions, say. Given the dependence of the latter on the underlying
distribution of frictions, the answer is unfortunately, but not surprisingly, negative. It is possible,
however, to get some guidance from analytic results, which are presented next.
models), which are not presented for brevity. The only exception is the case of a permanent growth rate shock in a
Calvo economy with no strategic complementarities (θ =1 ), in which the shock has no real eﬀects in any case.
10Another possibility is to use the median duration of price rigidity, as advocated by Bils and Klenow (2004).
Although not shown here, it also performs poorly in tracking the behavior of the heterogeneous economy.
11Baharad and Eden (2004) also argue in favor of the average duration of price rigidity instead of the average
frequency of price adjustments when there is heterogeneity, in the context of a Taylor type model.
134.1 Analytic results: cumulative output eﬀects
As seen previously, in general the dynamics of heterogeneous economies of the type analyzed here
depend on the underlying distribution of frictions. However, in the case of permanent shocks there
is a sensible measure of the overall eﬀects of monetary disturbances which only depends on a few
moments of such distribution: the (normalized) cumulative output eﬀect, which takes into account
both the intensity and the persistence of the real eﬀects of monetary shocks.12 Albeit particular,
permanent shocks allow sharp analytic results, which serve as guidelines for understanding the eﬀects
of more general AR(1) type shocks.
4.1.1 Permanent shocks
In the case of a permanent level shock, the following two results shed additional light on the com-
parison between a model with arbitrary heterogeneity, and identical ﬁrms models with calibrations
based on average durations and average frequencies, as previously illustrated in Figure 1. Note that
the results apply to all four price setting models.
Proposition 1 In the context of permanent level shocks (ρ =0 ) and no strategic complementari-
ties (θ =1 ), the (normalized) cumulative output eﬀect as measured by 1
m
R ∞
0 m−p(t)dt is equal to:
i) the average duration of price rigidity in the economy, in the case of sticky price models;
ii) the average duration of price plans in the economy, in the case of sticky information models.
This result shows why, without strategic complementarities, the impulse response functions for
the identical ﬁrms economies with the same average duration of the relevant frictions will, in some
sense, track their heterogeneous ﬁrms counterparts: for permanent level shocks the cumulative real
eﬀects that they imply are the same.
The identical ﬁrms economy with the same average frequency of price adjustment or average
frequency of price plan revisions, on the other hand, will systematically understate the real eﬀects
of monetary shocks in the heterogeneous economy, as shown below:
Proposition 2 In the context of permanent level shocks (ρ =0 ) and no strategic complementarities
(θ =1 ), an arbitrary heterogeneous economy will always display larger (normalized) cumulative
output eﬀects (as measured by 1
m
R ∞
0 m − p(t)dt) than an identical ﬁrms economy with the same
average frequency of price adjustments (in the case of sticky price models), or average frequency of
price plan revisions (in the case of sticky information models).
12This measure is also discussed, for example, in Christiano et al. (2005). It is widely used in the context of
disinﬂations, being referred to as the Sacriﬁce Ratio.
14This is a direct result of Jensen’s inequality. The intuition as to why the average frequency
of price adjustments or of price plan revisions can be misleading as an indicator of overall degree
of frictions can be developed from the following limiting case: imagine a heterogeneous economy
with a non-negligible fraction of ﬁrms which adjust prices (or revise price plans) continuously. Then,
irrespective of how low the frequencies of adjustment/revision of the remaining ﬁrms are, the average
frequency in the economy will be inﬁnite. Nevertheless, monetary shocks will clearly have real eﬀects
due to the ﬁrms with ﬁnite adjustment/revision frequencies. The intuition of this extreme example
carries through to more realistic distributions: in heterogeneous economies, high average frequencies
of price adjustment or price plan revisions need not imply low degrees of friction (note that the
implication does hold in identical ﬁrms economies). One might conjecture that getting rid of the
extremes in the distribution of adjustment/revision frequencies by using the median rather than the
average frequency would solve this problem, but this is not what is to be taken from the above
results, since Proposition 1 clearly states that average durations, not median frequencies nor
median durations, are directly related to the real eﬀects of monetary shocks.
In the case of growth rate shocks, however, taking Jensen’s inequality into account and using
the average duration instead of the average frequency to calibrate de identical ﬁrms economy does
not suﬃce. The reason is that heterogeneity as measured by σ2
n ≡
R n∗
0 f (n)(n − n)
2 dn has an
additional, direct impact on total output eﬀects, as shown below:
Proposition 3 In the context of permanent growth rate shocks (λ =0 ) and no strategic comple-





i) For the Calvo model:
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The intuition for why heterogeneity has a direct eﬀect on total output eﬀects in the case of
growth rate shocks, but not in the case of level shocks, can be developed from the identical ﬁrms
case. With level shocks, a change in (expected) duration aﬀects the speed of the adjustment process,
but not the magnitude of real output eﬀects. In the case of growth rate shocks, however, a higher
15(expected) duration increases the magnitude of output eﬀects, and reduces the speed at which they
fade away. Jointly, these two “channels” lead total output eﬀects to depend on the square of the
relevant (expected) duration. With heterogeneity, the mechanism at place is qualitatively the same,
and the overall eﬀect is the weighted average of the eﬀects for each group of ﬁrms, thus being
proportional to the second moment of the relevant distribution of (expected) durations.
Both sticky price models exhibit a discontinuity in the relation between the cumulative output
eﬀect and the persistence of the growth rate shock at the point corresponding to permanent shocks
(λ =0 ). This is most clearly seen in the case of the Calvo model, with a shock such that ∆π = −π.
In the case of a permanent shock, ﬁrms that get to adjust after t =0set pn,i (t)=0forever, because
nominal aggregate demand is forecast to remain unchanged. Since at t =0prices are, on average,
equal to zero, and signals are independent of when each ﬁrm last adjusted, output is identically
zero after the shock. With a temporary shock, however, nominal aggregate demand growth will
eventually resume to its previous level π,a n dﬁrms take this into account when setting prices. Due
to nominal rigidities they set higher prices, and so the shock does have real eﬀects.13 Al e s se x t r e m e ,
but conceptually analogous discontinuity occurs in the case of Taylor’s model.
Thus, in the case of temporary shocks, the equivalent of results i) (specially) and ii) from Propo-
sition 3 will be qualitatively diﬀerent. Nevertheless, the result that total output eﬀects are propor-
tional to the second moment of the relevant distribution of durations will hold (approximately) for
all models in the case of very persistent (but temporary) shocks.
4.1.2 Temporary shocks
As highlighted earlier, in the case of growth rate shocks sticky price models exhibit a discontinuity in
the relation between the cumulative output eﬀect and the persistence of the shock at λ =0 .I ta r i s e s
from the diﬀerences in price setting behavior in permanent versus temporary growth rate shocks.
However, despite these discontinuities and the fact that the impulse response functions implied
by the four models are generally diﬀerent, the following result, surprisingly, holds:
Proposition 4 In the context of temporary level shocks (ρ>0) with no strategic complementarities
(θ =1 ), the (normalized) cumulative output eﬀect as measured by 1
m
R ∞
0 m(t) − p(t)dt is equal to:




















13There are no such discontinuities in the case of level shocks.
16In the context of temporary growth rate shocks (λ>0) with no strategic complementarities (θ =1 ),
the (normalized) cumulative output eﬀect as measured by 1
∆π
R ∞
0 m(t) − p(t)dt equals:

























Figures 2a,b,d,e show the normalized cumulative output eﬀects of both level and growth rate
shocks as a function of the corresponding decay parameter, using the empirical distribution of price
rigidity in the US, for all models. The identical ﬁrms economies were constructed with the same
relevant average duration. From Figures 2a,b,c, in the context of level shocks it is apparent that
correcting for Jensen’s inequality makes the behavior of the heterogeneous and the identical ﬁrms
economies similar. In the case of growth rate shocks (Figures 2d,e,f) this correction does not suﬃce,
and, except for very short-lived shocks, the real eﬀects of monetary shocks are signiﬁcantly larger in
the heterogeneous economies.
5 Quantitative analysis
Recall that all analytic and qualitative results derived so far rested on the simplifying assumption
of no strategic complementarities/real rigidities (θ =1 ). Even then, the implications of accounting
for heterogeneity are not trivial in quantitative terms. For example, for level shocks, taking the case
of ρ =0as a benchmark, the increase in total output eﬀects when heterogeneity is accounted for
exceeds 70% in the case of the US economy: the inverse of the average frequency of price changes
reported by Bils and Klenow (2004), which is the usual measure, is 3.8 months, while the average
duration of price rigidity is 6.6 months.14 For growth rate shocks, again focusing on permanent
(or very persistent) shocks as a benchmark, the results are much more pronounced: based on the
statistics reported by Bils and Klenow (2004), σn =7 .1 months, which means that the ratio of total
output eﬀects computed correctly to the usual measure is
(6.6)2+(7.1)2
(3.8)2 =6 .5! Even correcting for
Jensen’s inequality and using the average duration produces cumulative eﬀects which are less than
half of the those in the heterogeneous economy.
Introducing strategic complementarities exacerbates the role of heterogeneity even further. To
illustrate this result I start by displaying impulse response functions (IRFs) for several combinations
14For the Euro area, the results reported by Dhyne et al. (2004) are even more pronounced: the usual measure is 6.6
months, while the average duration of price rigidity ranges from 13 to 15.1 months, depending on how the individual
country data is aggregated.
17of shocks and models. For growth rate shocks I display IRFs of output and inﬂation, while for level
shocks I depict IRFs of output and of the aggregate price level. Note that all the comparisons involve
identical ﬁrms economies with the same relevant average duration as their heterogeneous ﬁrms
counterparts. So, I am already correcting the usual measure in accounting for Jensen’s inequality.
The comparison against identical ﬁrms economies with the same average frequencies would imply an
even larger role for heterogeneity.
Figures 3a-h, 4a-h, and 5a-h display the results for the cases of Taylor pricing, sticky informa-
tion, and staggered sticky information, respectively.15 All cases include IRFs both with and without
strategic complementarities. For comparison purposes, I set θ =0 .1 when there are strategic com-
plementarities, since this is a standard calibration in this literature (e.g. Mankiw and Reis, 2002,
and Dupor and Tsuruga, 2005).
From these results it is clear that strategic complementarities interact with heterogeneity to gen-
erate more persistent real eﬀects of monetary shocks. Real rigidities do make the adjustment process
more sluggish, even in the identical ﬁrms case. With heterogeneity, however, this is even more so,
according to several metrics: the recession troughs are delayed, output is lower than in the identical
ﬁrms economy essentially during the whole process, and takes much longer to return to the steady
state; inﬂation is, accordingly, also more persistent. The cumulative eﬀects on output, obtained
through numerical integration, conﬁrm the interaction of heterogeneity and strategic complementar-
ities. Figures 6a-f present results analogous to ﬁgures 2a-f, with θ =0 .1. Now, even for level shocks
(Figures 6a-c) it is the case that total output eﬀects are larger in the heterogeneous economy. For
growth rate shocks (Figures 6d-f) the diﬀerences are ampliﬁed even further. As an example, in the
case of permanent growth rate shocks, the ratio of cumulative output eﬀects in the heterogeneous
economy to those in the identical ﬁrms economy goes from around 2.15 for all models when θ =1to
3.5 − 6 (depending on the model), when θ =0 .1.
The intuition for these results can be understood in the context of the framework developed
by Haltiwanger and Waldman (1991). With no strategic complementarities, relative to an identical
ﬁrms economy with the same average duration of price rigidity, heterogeneous economies initially
display faster adjustment owing to a relatively higher measure of ﬁrms with shorter (expected)
durations, which get to adjust earlier. As time passes, the distribution of durations among ﬁrms
which have not yet adjusted prices or updated price plans becomes more and more dominated by
ﬁrms with relatively longer (expected) durations, slowing down the adjustment process. The weight
of each group of ﬁrms in this process corresponds directly to the distribution f (·). On the other
hand, when there are strategic complementarities, the decisions of ﬁrms with shorter durations are
inﬂuenced by the existence of ﬁrms with longer durations, since the former do not want to set prices
that will deviate “too much” from the aggregate price in the future. Therefore ﬁrms with longer
“contract lengths” end up having a disproportionate eﬀect on the price level. That is, strategic
complementarities interact with heterogeneity to make the adjustment process even more sluggish.
15The Calvo model was omitted, because solving the model with strategic complementarities is extremely demanding
in computational terms.
185.1 Fitting IRFs with an identical ﬁrms model
After developing a better understanding of how heterogeneity in price setting introduces persistence
in monetary economies, in this subsection I ﬁnally revisit a question posed earlier in the paper:
which parameterization for an identical ﬁrms economy will best mimic the dynamics of a given
heterogeneous economy in terms of its impulse response functions?
For that purpose I conduct the following experiment:16 given the empirical distribution of (ex-
pected) durations used in all previous simulations, and a value for θ in the heterogeneous economy,
what are the average (expected) duration (nid) and degree of strategic complementarities (1 − θid)
in the identical ﬁrms economy that minimize the integral of squared deviations of its IRFs from the
heterogeneous economy’s IRFs.17 I do this calculation for several values of θ in the heterogeneous
economy, for several shocks, and also use absolute deviations instead of squared deviations.
The results are presented in Tables 1a-d (sticky information) and 2a-d (staggered sticky informa-
tion). Given the analyses of the previous sections, one might have guessed that ﬁtting the IRFs of a
truly heterogeneous economy with an identical ﬁrms model would require higher (average) durations
and perhaps more strategic complementarities than in the heterogeneous economy. This, however,
is not exactly the case. A higher average duration is indeed required, and the more so the higher
the degree of real rigidities in the heterogeneous economy (1 − θ). Despite the fact that the average
duration of price rigidity reported by Bils and Klenow (2004) is approximately 2.2 quarters, the “best
ﬁtting average duration” for the identical ﬁrms models ranges from 5 to 11 quarters, depending on
the model, the type of shock,18 and the degree of strategic complementarity in the original hetero-
geneous economy. The degree of strategic complementarity in the identical ﬁrms economy, however,
is systematically lower than in the heterogeneous economy, but they do vary in the same direction.
These results are robust across all combinations of shocks and (sticky information) models.
My understanding of why the average duration, but not the degree of strategic complementarity,
turns out to be higher in the identical ﬁrms economies is admittedly imperfect. My intuition is as
follows. Frictions to price setting, in the form of non-zero durations, are necessary (and suﬃcient)
for monetary shocks to have real eﬀects in these models. Strategic complementarities, on the other
hand, are neither necessary nor suﬃcient: they simply strengthen the role or price setting frictions,
but have no eﬀect by themselves (i.e. in the absence of price setting frictions). Therefore, the main
channel through which persistence is increased in the identical ﬁrms models to approximate the
heterogeneous economy must be the average duration. The best ﬁtting level of average durations,
however, generates “too much” persistence, given the original degree of strategic complementarities,
because of the interaction between ﬁrms with lower and higher durations (akin to “responders” and
“non-responders” in the terminology of Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1991). Therefore, θid increases
16Due to the computational demands for solving the sticky price models with strategic complementarities, I only
perform the experiments for both sticky information models, for which an explicit analytical solution is available. Given
the mechanisms underlying the results, however, I conjecture that the same regularities are to be found in the sticky
price models.
17I use IRFs for output.
18In the simulations I considered permanent shocks, and shocks with decay parameter of 0.5 (half life of 1.4 years).
19relative to θ (often to the extent of implying strategic substitutability - θid > 1 - rather than
complementarity) to provide a better ﬁt.
These results show that we must be cautious when interpreting estimates of parameters of price
setting frictions and real rigidities based on identical ﬁrms models, or calibrating them in such mod-
els based on micro evidence. The point is not that identical ﬁrms models are unable to provide
a reasonable description of a more complex, heterogeneous reality, but rather that this is likely to
require parameter values which will seem unrealistic if interpreted literally. Given the empirical
evidence documenting a high degree of heterogeneity and the fact that it does matter, the parame-
ters of (mispeciﬁed) identical ﬁrms models cannot be seen as “structural,” and should be treated
accordingly.19
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, I argued that heterogeneity in price setting frictions should have a larger role in
models which attempt to analyze the real eﬀects of monetary shocks. Standard models of nominal
price rigidity usually assume that all ﬁrms are identical in terms of price setting behavior. This
would be a good approximation either if empirically the degree of heterogeneity were small or if,
despite signiﬁcant in the real world, heterogeneity turned out not to matter.
Available empirical evidence points to the existence of a high degree of heterogeneity in price
setting frictions. This paper provided analytical results which show that heterogeneity aﬀects the
dynamic response of economies to monetary shocks. Relative to an identical-ﬁrms economy with the
same average degree of frictions, heterogeneous economies initially display faster adjustment owing
to a relatively higher measure of ﬁrms with shorter “contract lengths,” which get to adjust earlier. As
time passes, the distribution of contract lengths among ﬁrms which have not yet adjusted becomes
more and more dominated by ﬁrms with relatively longer contracts, slowing down the adjustment
process. When there are strategic complementarities in price setting, the decision to adjust by ﬁrms
which face lower price setting frictions is inﬂuenced by the existence of ﬁrms facing higher frictions,
which end up having a disproportionate eﬀect on the price level. Strategic complementarities interact
with heterogeneity to make the adjustment process even more sluggish.
Using the distribution of the frequency of price adjustments reported recently by Bils and Klenow
(2004) to calibrate the distribution of frictions in the four models that I considered, I obtained impor-
tant quantitative diﬀerences between models with identical ﬁrms and models with heterogeneity. In
particular, I showed that reproducing the dynamics of a truly heterogeneous economy with a model
based on identical ﬁrms requires substantially larger degrees of price setting frictions.
These results might help shed some additional light on the so called persistence problem (Chari
et al., 2000). Some recent papers which carry out quantitative evaluations of sticky-price DSGE
models based on identical ﬁrms ﬁnd that in order to obtain good empirical performance one needs
19Smets and Wouters (2003) hint at the possibility that heterogeneity could bias their results (footnote n. 3).
Christiano et al. (2005) claim that “inference about nominal rigidities is sensitive to getting the real side of the model
right,” but ignore the possibility that the same applies to heterogeneity in terms of price (and perhaps wage) setting.
20unrealistically low frequencies of price adjustment. A natural step is to fully assess the empirical
relevance of the results obtained in this paper for this issue, by introducing heterogeneity in a
standard DSGE model, and taking the model to the data. Promising results in this direction appear
in Coenen and Levin (2004).
Another research question motivated by these results, which I am currently working to address,
is whether heterogeneity in price setting of the sort considered in this paper can account for the
so called Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) puzzle. A recent paper by Imbs et al. (2005) shows,
using econometric methods, that aggregation of heterogeneous dynamics in terms of deviations from
the law of one price can account for the PPP puzzle. They use econometric methods to calculate
the half life of deviations from PPP in a way that accounts for the aggregation bias, and therefore
makes their measure comparable to theoretical constructs based on models in which the persistence of
deviations from the law of one price is the same across diﬀerent goods. My results suggest addressing
the same question in the opposite direction: writing a model with explicit heterogeneous dynamics
in deviations from the law of one price, arising from heterogeneity in price setting frictions, and
assessing whether it can match the dynamic properties of deviations from PPP found in the data.
21Appendix
I start by characterizing the initial inﬂationary steady state in each model.
Calvo pricing































and output is constant at the natural rate y(t)=0 .
Taylor staggered price setting








































Output is, therefore, constant at y(t)=0 .
Sticky information models
In both sticky information models ﬁrms trivially set pn,i (t)=p(t)=m(t),s ot h a ty(t)=0 .
22Proofs of propositions
Proposition 1 In the context of permanent level shocks (ρ =0 ) and no strategic complemen-
tarities (θ =1 ), the (normalized) cumulative output eﬀect as measured by 1
m
R ∞
0 m−p(t)dt is equal
to:
i) the average duration of price rigidity in the economy, in the case of both sticky price models;
ii) the average duration of price plans in the economy, in the case of both sticky information
models.
Proof. The ﬁrst step is to show that:
a) the eﬀects in the sticky information model are identical to the ones under Calvo pricing, and
b) that the same is true for staggered sticky information relative to the Taylor model.
This is straightforward. For a) just compare (3) and (6); and for b) compare (4) and (7), and (5)
and (8). In all cases set ρ =0and θ =1 .
Now, derive the expression for the (normalized) cumulative output eﬀect for each pair of models.







































































































Proposition 2 In the context of permanent level shocks (ρ =0 ) and no strategic complementar-
ities (θ =1 ), an arbitrary heterogeneous economy will always display larger (normalized) cumulative
output eﬀects (as measured by 1
m
R ∞
0 m − p(t)dt) than an identical ﬁrms economy with the same
average frequency of price adjustments (in the case of sticky price models), or average frequency of
price plan revisions (in the case of sticky information models).
Proof. The results follow directly from Jensen’s inequality, combined with Proposition 1.F o rt h e
sticky price models, pick the average frequency of price adjustments in the identical ﬁrms economy
to match that of the corresponding heterogeneous economy (
R n∗
0 f (n) 1
ndn for Calvo pricing, and
R n∗
0 f (n) 2
ndn for the Taylor’s model). Then, the average duration of price rigidity in the heteroge-
neous economy equals:
i) For Calvo pricing:
R n∗
0 f (n)ndn >
³R n∗
0 f (n) 1
ndn
´−1
= average duration of price rigidity in
the identical ﬁrms economy.
ii) For Taylor pricing:
R n∗
0 f (n) n
2dn >
³R n∗
0 f (n) 2
ndn
´−1
= average duration of price rigidity in
the identical ﬁrms economy.
For the sticky information models do the analogous steps with the average frequency of price
plan revisions.
Finally, since the relevant average durations in the heterogeneous economies exceed the durations
in the identical ﬁrms economies, applying Proposition 1 completes the proof.
Proposition 3 In the context of permanent growth rate shocks (λ =0 ) and no strategic comple-



















and integrating tdt. The same “trick” should be applied to all similar integrals found subsequently.
24i) For the Calvo model:
zero;






















Proof. i) Calvo pricing:


























n(t−s) ((π + ∆π)s +( π + ∆π)n)ds
¶
dn
=( π + ∆π)t
= m(t),
so that output is identically zero.
ii) Taylor model:










































































































































































iv) Staggered sticky information:













































































Proposition 4 In the context of temporary level shocks (ρ>0) with no strategic complementar-
ities (θ =1 ), the (normalized) cumulative output eﬀect as measured by 1
m
R ∞
0 m(t)−p(t)dt is equal
to:




















In the context of temporary growth rate shocks (λ>0) with no strategic complementarities (θ =1 ),
the (normalized) cumulative output eﬀect as measured by 1
∆π
R ∞
0 m(t) − p(t)dt equals:












































































































































































































































































































































b) Staggered sticky information

























dndt.T h e t r i c k i s










and integrating h2 (t,ρ)dt.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































b) Staggered sticky information:
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Calvo Pricing























Average frequencyFigure 2a Figure 2d
Figure 2b Figure 2e
Figure 2c Figure 2f
Normalized Cumulative Output Effects (NCOE), without strategic complementarities (θ = 1)
Growth Rate Shocks Level Shocks























































































Calvo / Sticky Information
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Calvo / Sticky Information
Taylor / SSIFigure 3a Figure 3b
Figure 3c Figure 3d
Figure 3e Figure 3f
Figure 3g Figure 3h
Temporary Level Shock: m = -0.1, ρ = 0.5
Taylor Pricing
Permanent Growth Rate Shock: π = 0.1, ∆π = -0.1, λ = 0
Temporary Growth Rate Shock: π = 0.1, ∆π = -0.1, λ = 0.5



































































































































































θ = 0.1Figure 4a Figure 4b
Figure 4c Figure 4d
Figure 4e Figure 4f
Figure 4g Figure 4h
Temporary Level Shock: m = -0.1, ρ = 0.5
Sticky Information (Mankiw and Reis, 2002)
Permanent Growth Rate Shock: π = 0.1, ∆π = -0.1, λ = 0
Temporary Growth Rate Shock: π = 0.1, ∆π = -0.1, λ = 0.5

































































































































































Identical firms θ = 1
θ = 0.1Figure 5a Figure 5b
Figure 5c Figure 5d
Figure 5e Figure 5f
Figure 5g Figure 5h
Temporary Level Shock: m = -0.1, ρ = 0.5
Staggered Sticky Information (Dupor and Tsuruga, 2005)
Permanent Growth Rate Shock: π = 0.1, ∆π = -0.1, λ = 0
Temporary Growth Rate Shock: π = 0.1, ∆π = -0.1, λ = 0.5































































































































































θ = 0.1Figure 6a Figure 6d
Figure 6b Figure 6e
Figure 6c Figure 6f
Normalized Cumulative Output Effects (NCOE), with strategic complementarities (θ = 0.1)



















































































































Staggered Sticky InformationPermanent Growth Rate Shock (λ = 0) Temporary Growth Rate Shock (λ = 0.5)
θ nid θid nid θid θ nid θid nid θid
0.10 2.36 1.56 2.21 1.32 0.10 1.90 0.96 1.84 0.90
0.15 2.23 2.03 2.10 1.74 0.15 1.82 1.37 1.77 1.24
0.20 2.15 2.47 2.03 2.15 0.20 1.77 1.65 1.73 1.57
0.50 1.96 4.97 1.88 4.51 0.50 1.66 3.62 1.64 3.54
1.00 1.87 8.95 1.81 8.29 1.00 1.61 6.83 1.61 6.80
Table 1a Table 1b
Permanent Level Shock (ρ = 0) Temporary Level Shock (ρ = 0.5)
θ nid θid nid θid θ nid θid nid θid
0.10 1.72 0.78 1.70 0.75 0.10 1.49 0.60 1.49 0.60
0.15 1.65 1.07 1.63 1.05 0.15 1.47 0.89 1.47 0.89
0.20 1.61 1.36 1.60 1.35 0.20 1.46 1.18 1.45 1.17
0.50 1.52 3.11 1.51 3.08 0.50 1.45 2.92 1.40 2.78
1.00 1.50 6.07 1.46 5.80 1.00 1.43 5.76 1.33 5.20
Table 1c Table 1d
Obs: durations are reported in years.
Sticky Information (Mankiw and Reis, 2002)
Absolute deviations Squared deviations Absolute deviations Squared deviations
Absolute deviations Squared deviations Absolute deviations Squared deviationsPermanent Growth Rate Shock (λ = 0) Temporary Growth Rate Shock (λ = 0.5)
θ nid θid nid θid θ nid θid nid θid
0.10 2.74 4.74 2.60 4.05 0.10 2.24 2.88 2.32 3.03
0.15 2.24 4.28 2.37 4.54 0.15 2.14 3.89 2.11 3.52
0.20 2.18 5.36 2.17 5.00 0.20 1.86 3.57 1.99 4.05
0.50 1.75 7.40 1.86 8.35 0.50 1.67 6.83 1.76 7.32
1.00 1.63 12.40 1.73 13.94 1.00 1.60 11.84 1.55 11.00
Table 2a Table 2b
Permanent Level Shock (ρ = 0) Temporary Level Shock (ρ = 0.5)
θ nid θid nid θid θ nid θid nid θid
0.10 1.78 1.52 1.86 1.69 0.10 1.64 1.28 1.70 1.36
0.15 1.65 1.95 1.73 2.10 0.15 1.57 1.72 1.60 1.78
0.20 1.60 2.38 1.65 2.52 0.20 1.52 2.16 1.54 2.19
0.50 1.48 5.09 1.46 4.88 0.50 1.42 4.75 1.37 4.39
1.00 1.40 9.30 1.32 8.10 1.00 1.31 8.30 1.23 7.25
Table 2c Table 2d
Obs: durations are reported in years.
Staggered Sticky Information (Dupor and Tsuruga, 2005)
Absolute deviations Squared deviations Absolute deviations Squared deviations
Absolute deviations Squared deviations Absolute deviations Squared deviations